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Hindsight, Organizational Routines
and Media Risk Coverage
Robert A. Stallings*

Introduction
When I began this essay, a television in the background was
continually broadcasting a request for doctors and nurses to report to
hospitals in the San Fernando Valley section of Los Angeles. Another
earthquake had occurred, and local radio and television stations
discontinued normal programming to report the disaster. Helicopters
gave us aerial pictures of collapsed freeways and burning homes, field
reporters interviewed victims waiting stoically for treatment in the
parking lot of a damaged hospital, and in-studio anchors summarized
the tally of deaths and damage. This stream of pictures and words was
interrupted not by the usual commercials but by briefings from earth
scientists, telephone conversations with spokespersons for a variety of
public agencies and pledges of government assistance from politicians.
The risk of earthquakes, normally part of the stereotype of a future "Big
One," was on display at every integer of the TV remote control.
In the aftermath of that catastrophe, a story line appeared that also
usually follows accidents and disasters associated with technological
hazards. Reporters once again discovered that safety - the inverse of
risk - is administered by formal organizations. Actions and inactions,
decisions and non-decisions were examined much in the manner of the
play-calling of football coaches by Monday morning quarterbacks. In
the aftermath of catastrophe, some of those actions and decisions took
on meanings they would not have had otherwise. Several writers have
commented on this process, which I will call "coupling" to emphasize
its logical structure.
*
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5 Risk Health, Safety &Environment 271 [Summer 1994]

Selectivity in Coupling Organizational "Causes"
with Catastrophic "Effects"
Two examples of coupling appeared in the local news here in
January 1994. One involved the December 15, 1993 crash of a
corporate jet in which the five people on board were killed. The pilot
lost control while following a Boeing 757 on final approach to the
runway; the crash was attributed to turbulence created by the jetliner.
Subsequent reporting by the Los Angeles Times disclosed that the
federal agency which regulates the airline industry, the Federal Aviation
Administration (FAA), had known about the turbulence problem
associated with Boeing 757's for more than two years but had taken no
action. One week after the December 15 crash, the FAA issued a
directive to all domestic air traffic controllers that they give wake
turbulence warnings to pilots landing behind 757's. The Times quoted
several experts and officials on the FAA's "dilemma" in assuring the
safety of commercial air travel on the one hand while promoting the
economic well-being of the airline industry on the other.
The second example of coupling comes from one of the many
stories arising from the January 17, 1994, Northridge, California
earthquake. The Los Angeles Times on January 27 (at Al and A24)
reported that less that 10% of $376 million dollars generated by an
increase in property taxes in 1990 specifically designated for seismic
safety improvements had been spent at the time of the earthquake.
Similarly, only $53 million of $229 million raised for earthquake
retrofitting projects by two earlier voter-approved bond measures had
been spent. Reporters described the money as "languishing" in the city
treasury. Officials quoted in the article offered differing reasons for the
ratio of spent to unspent funds. City department heads pointed to a
lack of sufficient staff to draw up plans, write bid specifications and
monitor contracts at a more rapid pace. They also noted the many
checks-and-balances built into the process of contracting publiclyfunded projects. City council members in contrast complained about a
lack of leadership at the departmental level and asserted that their
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refusal to authorize the hiring of additional staff reflected their intent
to hold down the size of city government as well as to ensure that
money raised for seismic projects was preserved for direct costs. The
article was interspersed with examples of earthquake damage suffered
by the types of publicly-owned structures that were targeted for seismic
updating under these programs.
Both of these examples identify an aspect common to reporting
about risks that have suddenly been realized in the form of accidents
and catastrophes. In hindsight, the catastrophe or some aspect of it is
depicted as having been caused by some characteristic of a formal
organization. The link between organizational "cause" and catastrophic
"effect" becomes a "working hypothesis" that shapes news coverage of
the event. Working hypotheses provide a framework explaining to
journalists and their audiences alike why things happened, serving as
definitions of the situation or quasi-theories. The causal chain formed
by coupling disaster with some prior organizational trait also influences
the assignment of blame and political responsibility.
Working hypotheses connecting organizational characteristics and
disastrous outcomes differ from formal research hypotheses. No
empirical evidence is ever presented with which they might be tested.
Their plausibility and the stature of news sources who endorse them
seem to be the principal forms of "confirmation." Indeed, in most cases
it is hard to think of any way to apply standard research methods to
evaluate them empirically. In the FAA illustration, for example, wake
turbulence testing has been done on the Boeing 757, and other crashes
attributed to 757 turbulence have been documented. However, these
data suggest only that the physical effects of one type of aircraft can be
a risk to lighter and smaller airplanes following in its wake. The two
working hypotheses linking organizationalphenomena and accidents
remain untested. One hypothesis is that the failure of the FAA to issue
a wake-turbulence warning caused the accident. The other is that the
goal structure of the FAA causes aircraft accidents. The coupling of
refusal to act on available information and aircraft crash seems like a
plausible hypothesis. However, there must be thousands of other
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instances in which the same organization chose not to issue a safety
advisory that have not -

or have not yet -

been linked by reporters to

a tragic event. And the hypothesis coupling the agency's goals with
accidents ignores the fact that the interests of groups concerned with
safety and those of profit-making organizations like the airlines will
conflict regardless of how the agency is configured.
The most troubling aspect of this process of coupling in news work
is its selectivity. Working hypotheses are nearly always monocausal; the
events they endeavor to explain seem more complex. An alternative
view of cause and effect would assume that everything people do on
behalf of the organizations responsible for administering safety is part
of a continuous and complex causal sequence winding through and
beyond any catastrophe. In this view, singling out one or two
antecedents as causes is a social (some might say political) rather than
"scientific" process. It raises several important questions about how
working hypotheses develop in news coverage of technological hazards
and disasters, most importantly: What kinds of actions are selected for
coupling with a catastrophe?
The more proximate the act, the more likely it is to be coupled with
some catastrophic outcome. Proximate acts have two characteristics.
They are proximate in the sense of being located in time closer to the
outcome that they are alleged to have caused. Less proximate acts are
those that took place farther back in time. However, this temporal
dimension masks a more important aspect of proximity. Proximate acts
are those carried out at the "lowest rung on the ladder." Proximate acts
are the things that operators and inspectors do, for example. It is this
aspect of proximity that is reflected in empirical data showing operator
error to be the most frequent officially-selected cause of many types of
technological accidents.
When the same hypothesis is stated in reverse, the selectivity of
coupling becomes more evident. That is, the less proximate the act, the
easier it is for those associated with it to resist being coupled with a
disastrous outcome. In the (greatly simplified) hierarchy enveloping
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public organizations, operators and inspectors take orders from
supervisors who in turn are managed by department heads whose bosses
are the elected officials who "work" for the voters. The ability to deflect
causal responsibility for harm roughly parallels this hierarchical
arrangement. In the FAA example, voters' desires for "doing something
about the economy," travelers' preferences for convenient departure
times and inexpensive air fares, international events involving U.S.
diplomatic and military intervention as well as wake turbulence data on
Boeing 757's could all have been coupled with the crash in California,
but only the last emerged in the working hypothesis in stories about it.
Two intervening variables further elaborate the hypothesis of
proximity and causal coupling. One is the collection of "heroes, villains
and fools" available in the cultural repertoire at a given time. Public
organizations (bureaucracies) and the people who work in them
(bureaucrats) currently have an especially negative reputation.
Politicians who otherwise might have their own image problems have
little difficulty casting themselves in the role of heroes vis-a-vis "the
bureaucracy" in interviews with reporters. For example, it is much easier
for us - and for journalists - to envision ineptitude, incompetence, or
even corruption in what building inspectors do during a typical work
day, for example, than to see their frequent arguments with
homeowners, contractors and developers as "heroic struggles" to
increase seismic safety. Similarly, it is easier to see those who
recommend against taking immediate action concerning 757 wake
turbulence as "captives" of the aviation and airline industries than as
professionals who have doubts about the quality of existing data, the
adequacy of previous tests, or whatever. In contrast, "heroes" are more
likely to avoid becoming causally linked to catastrophic outcomes in
the news. In the Northridge earthquake, some collapsed freeways had
been assigned low priority in a seismic strengthening program based
upon recommendations by earth scientists (about the only cultural
heroes in this area). Yet, the decision by government officials to
prioritize rather than the recommendations of scientists was coupled
with collapsed freeway bridges in news reports.
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A second intervening variable further elaborates the hypothesis
relating proximity and coupling. The longer a story containing a
working hypothesis runs in the news, the more likely that less proximate
organizational acts will be coupled with the outcome. Even a proximate
act such as the decision to postpone seismic upgrading can itself over
time be coupled with a less proximate act such as voter preferences for
reducing the size and cost of government. Long-running stories almost
by definition mean that reporters have come up with a new "angle" or
"slant." The passage of time allows reporters to explore how a sequence
of events led to the act (e.g., the decision to postpone) that in hindsight
had tragic consequences. The passage of time also allows news
consumers to understand how more remote acts tie in with the act that
has been singled out.
An Alternative View:
Risk and Safety as Organizational Variables
In the public sector, risk is distributed across and through the
organizations (public, for-profit and non-profit) that carry out public
policy. (Markets distribute risk in much the same way in the private
sector.) Safety is rationed within an interorganizational network as
public attention and political priorities shift from one type of risk to
another, as events make cooperation among organizations and public
support for their efforts more or less likely, and as organizational
resources are increased or withdrawn. Whatever level of safety public
policy is able to achieve, it is accomplished in the everyday work
routines of organizations.
Even though safety is not simply a function of resources, the
allocation of resources is symbolic of the seriousness with which various
risks are taken. Budget allocations described in dollar amounts provide
an understandable metric of commitment even though the level of risk
reduction they purchase is unknown. For example, increasing the
budget for the building department by 10% when the budgets for
other departments of local government are being reduced may show a
commitment to deal with the threat of earthquakes even though no
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measurable amount of increased seismic safety can be specified
precisely. Likewise, performing three tests on wake turbulence rather
than two seems like greater commitment to aviation safety, four tests
rather than three even more so, etc. At some point, however, someone
in an organization must decide when enough money has been spent on
wake-turbulence testing. Someone has to balance the seriousness of
wake turbulence against other risks such as the age of airframes, the
combustibility of fabrics and other materials used within the cabin, and
procedures for deicing aircraft during winter storms. These decisions
and the controversies that erupt over them are about acceptable costs,
not acceptable risks. Risk is determined to a very real yet unknown
extent when decisions about costs are made.
Going one step further, organizations also deal with issues of
"overhead." They may have little control over some components of
overhead such as the costs of group health insurance and of hiring
procedures that conform with affirmative-action laws. They do decide
(within limits) how organizational resources are allocated. No
organization commits all of its "troops" to the "frontlines." Not every
member of the building department is an inspector or a blueprint
checker, for example. Building departments also assign people to
answer the telephones and take messages, supervise other employees,
represent the department in budget meetings and engage in a variety of
activities that support seismic safety but do not directly involve plan
checking or field inspection. Whether resources consumed by
managerial and support functions are "essential" or "excessive" can look
different in hindsight than they would otherwise.
Consider the annual salary paid to a department head; it may look
essential if the city is to attract a person well qualified for the job, but it
may look excessive in the aftermath of catastrophe if that person's
performance becomes coupled with negative aspects of the outcome.
(The opposite is also possible; a salary that once seemed excessive can
look like "money well spent" if coupled with positive aspects of some
disastrous outcome.) Regardless, the qualifications of the building
5 Risk Health, Safety &Environment 271 [Summer 1994]

department head are in some way connected to the level of seismic
safety in a city, and the salary of the department head is in some way
connected to those qualifications, hence to safety as well. The same is
true for building inspectors and plan checkers. Is not the same true of
support personnel; of the quality and quantity of vehicles the
department is able to purchase; even the quality and quantity of
telephones, pagers and fax machines that it is able to afford?
In short, risk is embedded in organizations in these and all the other
characteristics of organizations as organizations. I therefore propose an
alternative hypothesis: the characteristics of organizations as
organizations determine levels of risk to which the public is exposed to
a greater extent than does any single act or decision. Yet it is the single
act that looks so decisive in hindsight. What are the consequences of
treating risk in monocausal fashion, as occurs in the coupling process,
rather than treating it as a variable property of organizations?
Blame Versus Policy Choices
First, the coupling that occurs in news coverage of technological
accidents and natural disasters alike overestimates the certainty of our
knowledge about risk. In hindsight, we know that following too close to
a 757 on approach can cause accidents. We know that some structures
which had undergone seismic retrofitting stood while others which had
not collapsed. Focusing on what organizations did not do - failing to
issue a directive, falling behind a previously-established time-table for
bidding and awarding contracts - ignores the question of whether
those actions would have prevented that crash or the collapse of that
particular structure. More accurately, it implicitly answers the question
in the affirmative.
Second, because the hindsight involved in coupling makes it appear
that organizations had certain knowledge of what the consequences of
their actions would be, the failure to utilize such knowledge needs to be
explained. Not surprisingly, given the cultural context, journalists
overwhelmingly seek out individuals to blame. Individual
incompetence, ignorance, lack of sensitivity, or malfeasance become
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explanations for risk. Sometimes news reports do portray individuals as
being caught up in organizational structures. However, the negative
images of organizations predominate: For example, organizations stifle
individual responsibility and discretion; organizations foster a lack of
concern for the public among employees; and interorganizational turf
wars prevent the sharing of relevant information.
Third, because coupling steers blame toward some actors and away
from others, it presents news audiences with a selective and partial
description of causal responsibility. It fixes blame at the same time that
it obscures accountability. Identifying those who are to blame is a
consequence of coupling that we all applaud in cases where illegal acts
have taken place (e.g., bribing building inspectors, deliberately
disregarding federal regulations). However, fixing responsibility by
coupling only one or two aspects of an organization with a catastrophic
outcome makes it more difficult to envision a variety of policy options
that might change organizations responsible for administering safety.
This is the vantage point provided by viewing risk and safety as
organizational phenomena. It sees day-to-day compromises and tradeoffs not as sinister but as inevitable features of work organizations. It
sees risk in multivariate fashion as a function of everything that
impinges upon organizational performance. Most importantly, it sees
organizations as the mechanisms for managing whatever level of safety a
society achieves. Rather than blaming "the usual suspects," an
organizational view expands the list of those accountable, widening the
range of policy options.
Is it naive to expect journalists to construct news reports about
technological hazards and natural disasters that reflect an organizational
view of risk? Time constraints and a preference for the visual aspects of
events make hard news coverage in television news an unlikely arena for
such a perspective. However, the print media, particularly investigative
reporters (especially those in the prestige press), can craft stories that go
beyond the "sound bites" of politicians attempting to deflect criticism
and administrators defending their agencies. By choosing whom to
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interview and what questions to ask, journalists can place stories about
risk in a context in which decisions affecting organizations. No matter
how remote they may seem at first, these are also decisions affecting
safety.

